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they actually happened and not with speculations upon what conceivably might have taken place under the authority of the act."
The Court also adhered to its previous decisions 23 holding
that statutory separation of the trials on the two issues involvedguilt and sanity-and trial of both issues to the same jury were not
without due process of law.
As it happened, the Court did not need to decide the constitutional issues in this case, since the conviction was reversed for
errors in the giving of instructions and in the admission of evidence. But the Court no doubt felt compelled to express its views
concerning the statute because of the frequency and vigor of the
attacks being made upon it, and because of the apparent need for
guidance of counsel and the trial court on re-trial of the case. The
Court considered the question of the validity of the statute important enough to order oral argument of the matter, allotting one
hour each to the State and the defendant.
For the further guidance of counsel and courts the Supreme
Court volunteered, by way of dicta, two further principles which
merit consideration here. First, a refusal on the part of a trial
court to admit defendant's evidence of mental derangement or
insanity in the trial of the defendant's guilt "would be a denial of
due process of law." And, second, referring to the statutory provision which reads "A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the
commission of the offense charged," the Court said, "As indicated
by the specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Holland in
Bauman v. People, supra, we doubt the validity of this provision,
."
The General Assembly, taking its cue from the decisions,
has modified the statutes 24 to permit the taking of testimony going to the defendant's incapacity to formulate intent or deliberate
in the trial of guilt, to eliminate the conclusive presumption of
guilt in the trial of the insanity issue, and to require trial on the
insanity issue prior to the trial on the issues raised by the plea of
not guilty.

CRIMINAL LAW
V. G. SEAVY of the Pueblo Bar

The cases which form the content of this review are those
found in Volume 7 of the advance sheets published by the Colorado
Bar Association, numbers 1 through 13.
Cases decided during this period dealing with the criminal
law are not numerically great, and there is little that falls without the category of reaffirmation. The writer has attempted, with
no great degree of success, to divide the cases into the two categories of procedure and substantive law. Some cases belong in
Ingles v. People, supra; Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P. 2d 987.
11Session Laws, 1955, Ch. 118.
13
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neither, and others belong in both. But perhaps the division is
warranted when the other known alternative would be to list the
cases numerically.
PROCEDURE

The most worthy subject of comment in a review of our criminal law of this past year are the repeated admonitions, suggestions,
and criticisms which the Court has made regarding the procedure
which should be followed when before it upon writ of error.
Although the Court, as it expressed in many of the cases here
under consideration, will overlook procedural shortcomings upon
the writ when it deems the merits of sufficient importance, this at
most is a hazardous position inasmuch as there is not always a
meeting of the minds in this regard between Court and counsel.
In the case of Will v. People,' the writ of error was dismissed
because of failure to present assignments of error, failure to present a record which contained objections to evidence of which the
defendant complained, and failure to note exceptions. Mr. Justice
Alter concludes by saying, "The record in this case is fatally defective; in disregard of all rules of criminal procedure, and does
not properly present any question for our determination."
The same Justice in Leonard McRae v. People,- made the following statement:
At the outset we call attention to the fact that our
court rules with reference to assignments of error, abstracts and briefs in criminal cases have been wholly disregarded in the instant case ... There is in the record in
our Court no abstract. We also call attention to the fact
that in criminal cases the rules of civil procedure adopted
by our Court, effective April 6, 1941, contain an express
provision that "Criminal procedure in the Supreme Court
shall be under the practice heretofore existing (order
of Supreme Court January 6, 1951)." The rules effective
in criminal cases require the filing of assignments of error
at the time of the filing of the record; fifteen copies of an
abstract of record, and printed briefs.
Such comments should provide a yellow light for all those
seeking review on writ of error. The legislature amended 39-7-24
and 39-7-27 of '53 C.R.S. dealing with writs of error in capital
and non-capital cases so that the distinguishing feature of tile
two sections is now the imposition of the death sentence.'
What would have been the principal criminal case decided in
the past year is now largely of only academic interest. Luckily, the
perplexities and confusion surrounding the procedure in insanity
cases, preserved by the current decision of Leick v. People,4 have
I Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 5, pg. 156; 278 P. (2d) 178.
2Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 9, pg. 280; 281 P. (2d) 153.
3S.B. 104, approved April 15, 1955.
7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 9, pg. 297; 281 P. (2d) 806
4Vol.
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been somewhat alleviated by legislative amendment. 5 The defendant entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of
insanity" to the charge of murder. He was tried and convicted
upon his "not guilty" plea and the jury fixed the penalty at death.
Two days later the same jury convened to find him sane upon trial
of his other plea. The question of the applicable statutes' constitutionality was raised, but the majority of the Court refused to
pass thereon. The contention was made that since defendant was
"conclusively presumed" to be sane upon the trial under his "not
guilty" plea (as provided by statute) he was denied due process
of law. But the Court found that voluminous evidence upon his
mental condition-including sanity-was introduced, and under
the well known maxim of constitutional law as applied to criminal
cases, the test is what was actually done, not what could have been
done.
Moreover, the Court stated that it would have been a denial
of due process had the trial court refused this evidence of mental
condition, including sanity, not for the purpose of guilt or innocence, but as bearing upon defendant's ability to deliberate "and
form the intent essential to murder in the first degree," citing
Ingles v. People.6 Judge Holland's comment in his specially concurring opinion indicated that he was "amazed at the adroitness with
which the majority of this Court still eschew the question of constitutionality of statutes that are constantly dogging the trail of
murder trials involving the procedure under pleas of insanity."
The cause was, however, reversed upon two other grounds.
An instruction as to what the jury should consider in regard to
evidence of mental condition was found contradictory, and error
was committed when testimony as to defendant's mental condition
was given by a psychiatrist who had observed and examined him.
The testimony was given during the People's case in chief in violation of 39-8-2, '53 C.R.S.. The ruling is important in that this
section stands unamended by the legislature.
There were two specially concurring opinions, one, as mentioned before, by Justice Holland, who made reference to his dissent in the Bauman case,' the other by Justice Clark who determined the statutes to be constitutional, and also apprised the
majority that in his opinion Battalino v. People 8 had modified the
rule of Ingles v. People, supra. Perhaps the trial judge had in mind
the Battalino case and its distinction between mental condition and
insanity when he gave the erroneous instruction, and while it still
may be considered somewhat contradictory, it does not reach that
degree of contradiction to which the majority attribute it.
The important amendments to the insanity procedure statutes
omit the "conclusive presumption of sanity" provision when the
H.B. 491, approved April 14, 1955.
'92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109. (1933).
'Bauman v. People, Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 30, 274 P. (2d)
118 Colo. 587, 199 P. (2d) 897 (1S48).
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proper plea has not been made, and the admission of guilt when
only the insanity plea has been made. They have provided that
the defendant must make an insanity plea if he is to rely on insanity as a defense; that evidence of mental condition is to be
admissible with reference to proving or disproving specific intent;
that when the insanity plea is joined with others, the issue of insanity is first tried or all are tried together, and that defendant
may demand separate trials, and, finally that when issues are tried
separately they are tried to different juriesY Whether the new
procedure will eliminate the frustrations of that which the Leick
case was determinative, only time will tell. It is to be wondered
whether the simplicity of pre-1927 procedure when everything
came in under the "not guilty" plea has not in retrospect proved
more worthy than was its alleged principal evil of the People's inability to prepare.
Other cases dealing with procedure have not been so arduous.
In People v. Gomez, 10 the Court was called upon in a review initiated by the People under the provisions of 39-7-27, '53 C.R.S. to
approve or disapprove the action of the trial court in directing a
verdict for the defendant. During the course of the trial and at the
conclusion of the opening statement made by the District Attorney,
the defendant moved for a directed verdict which was granted on
the ground that nothing was stated in the "opening statement
which would constitute a charge against the defendant." The
Supreme Court disapproved the lower court's action, finding (1)
it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to make an opening statement; (2) that the opening statement was in fact "sufficient to
entitle the District Attorney to introduce evidence in support of
the burglary charge", and (3) it was error to deny the District
Attorney leave to amend his statement upon his request to do so.
Three principal contentions were made in Hawkins v. People,"
which went to the Supreme Court after defendant had plead guilty
to and was sentenced for a crime against nature. Plaintiff in error
first contended that the trial judge erred in not considering probation. At the time of taking defendant's plea the trial court indicated that defendant had a right to apply for probation even
though the court was not disposed to grant the same in this type
case. However, the defendant failed to make application therefor,
and thus was in no position to claim error upon this point. The
defendant next contended that it was mandatory that the trial
court order a psychiatric examination under Art. 19, Ch. 39, '53
C.R.S. The Court stated that this is discretionary with the trial
court, for the examination is necessary only if the court proceeds
under the mentioned statute in committing defendant to an instition for a sentence of one day to life. Here the trial court elected
to proceed under the regular statute defining the offense.
I0Supra,

note 5.
' Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 11, pg. 386; 283 P. (2d) 949.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 8, pg. 269; 281 P. (2d) 156.
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Lastly, it was contended that the guilty plea was made involuntarily, which contention the record did not support, and that
evidence taken after the plea was insufficient to prove the corpus
delecti. But this is not the purpose of the taking of testimony in
this regard, said the high Court, but rather its purpose is to apprise the sentencing judge of mitigating or aggravating circumstances 12to guide him in imposing sentence, citing Champion v.
People.
A dismissal of an appeal to it from the County Court was
made by the District Court of Huerfano County and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Naranjo v. People." A conviction was had
against the defendant in the County Court for killing deer out of
season and related offenses. This being a criminal case it came
squarely within the provision of section 176, chapter 46, '35 C.S.A.,
which prohibits certain type criminal appeals to the District Court
and provides for appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court.
In People v. Griffith,1 4 it was held that the jurisdiction of the
county court over the person of the defendant was not "impaired
by the manner in which accused is brought before it."'
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that he was arrested without a
warrant, and was not taken immediately before a magistrate.
Other findings of jurisdictional validity were determined, and the
Court reversed the action of the court below in dismissing for lack
of jurisdiction.
With reference to defendant's unsuccessful contentions, this
is perhaps a proper place to interpose the following legislative
addition designated as 39-2-20, '53 C.R.S.
Any provision in this chapter prior to the effective
date of this act to the contrary notwithstanding, an arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person, without warrant, for a criminal offense committed in his presence; and by an officer, when a criminal offense has in fact
been committed, and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.I G
There were two cases before the Supreme Court during the
past year which dealt with bonds. The decision in Trujillo v. District Court of the County of Weld 67 ordered a bond reinstated.
The defendant had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter
and without a request by the sureties or the District Attorney the
court remanded petitioner to the custody of the sheriff and discharged the bondsmen, denying petitioner's motion that bond be
continued until disposition of motion for new trial. It was the
policy of the trial court to follow such procedure in all cases of
1"124 Colo. 253, 236 P. (2d) 127 (1951).
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 22; 274 P. (2d) 607.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 3, pg. 110; 276 P. (2d) 559.
522 C.J.S., pg. 236, section 144.
,6S.B. 251, approved April 9, 1955.
" Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 10, pg. 328; 282 P. (2d) 703.
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felony and manslaughter convictions. The error was that the
court's policy was in contravention of the discretionary provisions
in regard to bond continuances of 39-2-19, '53 C.R.S.
The second case, Allison v. People v. Adamson iS was also disposed of by a reversal, with two Justices dissenting. The interesting facts of the case making it one of first impression warrant a
somewhat lengthy comment. The defendant was at liberty on bond
pending trial for burglary. While at liberty he was convicted and
sentenced for a felony in California, and thus could not appear on
the date set for trial. The plaintiffs in error here entered into a
contract with the surety on the bond to indemnify it in case of
forfeiture-which was the result in the trial court. Thus, since
the surety did not seek review the indemnitors did.
The Court found indemnitors to be proper parties, then found
the lower court in error in its ruling of forfeiture. All due diligence and good faith surrounded the acts of both surety and indemnitors. The Court rejected the reasoning of one line of authority which holds relief should be granted only when the "undertaking has been rendered impossible or excusable (a) by an act
of God; (b) by an act of the obligee; or (c) by an act of law." 19
Rather, it adopted the rule that since the plaintiffs in error were
totally unable to bring defendant back, their plight is the same
were defendant dead or confined to bed 20by illness, thus bringing
the case under Western Surety v. People.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW

The first case appearing in this volume of the advance sheets
which dealt with the substantive law was People v. Gallegos.2 The
defendant was found not guilty of the charge of aggravated robbery. The people sought a reversal of the judgment under section
500, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A.
The facts were not in serious dispute and established that
defendant with the aid of a gun demanded and received wages
owing him from his employer. The Court affirmed on the basis of
Analytis v. People.23 The writer of the opinion defined animus
furandi as "a latih phrase which generally may be translated as
intent to steal, that is, a criminal intent to feloniously deprive an
owner of his property." Since there was no serious dispute as to
the fact that this money was owing him, this element was lacking,
and thus the not guilty judgment below was correct.
An interesting factor in this review was that the People were
"seeking a reversal of the judgment," and not merely an approval
or disapproval. The section mentioned expressly prohibits double
jeopardy in its application. Here the People were apparently go"sVol. 7, C.B.A. Ad Sh. No. 13, pg. 468; 286 P. (2d) 1102.
"State T. Pelley, 222 N. C. 684, 24 S.E. (2d) 635. (1943).
2120
Colo. 357, 208 P. (2d) 1164 (1949).
nPeople v. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 176 Pac. 329 (1918).
'Vol.
2368

7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 1, pg. 21; 274 P.

Colo. 74, 188 Pac. 1113 (1920).

(2d)

608.
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ing on the theory that even though the direction was made at the
conclusion of all the evidence, the direction was made by the court
solely on legal principles, the trial being to the court without a
jury. It would have been interesting to see whether a new trial
would have been ordered had the ruling been opposed to the trial
court's action.
4
Another affirmance was ordered by the Court in Roll v. People.2
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit the crime
of confidence game, and acquitted upon a substantive count charging confidence game. The rulings of the Court upon defendant's
contentions were for the most part based upon findings that the
trial court had not abused its discretion, (a) in endorsing at the
time of trial a witness who was a principal but had changed his
plea, (b) in permitting the same witness to testify when he remained in the court room for a short period of time after the rule
of exclusion had been invoked, but without the knowledge or consent of the District Attorney, and (c) in admitting a confession
which was alleged to be involuntary, the court having followed
the procedure in regard thereto as directed in Dozvney v. People.2
Although the question was not properly before it, the Court
also held that a conviction was properly returned upon the conspiracy count even though an acquittal was returned on the substantive charge. The Court found sufficient evidence of a plan,
scheme and design to cheat and swindle.
Justice Knauss, who wrote the opinion in Roll, supra, also
was the author of Hood v. People,-' which rejected the contentions
of plaintiff in error who had been convicted under the indecent
libertv statute.
The Court could find no error in permitting the victim, a girl
of nine years, to testify. Before permitting her to take the stand
the trial judge interrogated her at length to determine her qualifications and determined from her answers that she was qualified.
Nor was error committed in the introduction of similar offenses
when properly limited by instruction, and testimony as to the
silence of the defendant while under arrest was not prejudicial,
as "the admission of evidence which cannot have influenced the
27
jury, is harmless.1
The Court also held that it was not error in submitting only
one form of not guilty verdict to the jury covering the entire information when three guilty forms were given. The defendant
was charged in four counts: (1) assault coupled with the taking
of indecent liberties; (2) enticing or alluring into some place for
the purpose of taking such indecent liberties; (3) taking indecent
liberties, and (4) attempting to take such indecent liberties. Count
two was dismissed, and defendant was found guilty on count three.
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 11, pg. 398; 284 P. (2d) 665.
121 Colo. 307, 215 P. (2d) 892 (1950).
"Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 4, pg. 133; 277 P. (2d) 223.
McQueary v. People, 48 Colo. 214, 110 Pac. 210 (1910).
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The Court stated the District Attorney charged separate phases
of the same act in the four counts, and the jury was instructed
that it should not consider count four "unless it found defendant
not guilty of one or both of the offenses set forth in counts one
and three."
It is difficult to see how the jury could have found defendant
not guilty of any of the single offenses under the not guilty form
of verdict given to it. The Court, however, reasoned that since a
proper verdict upon one count was returned, there was no error.
Apparently the jury's common sense, and not proper legal procedures, form the basis of this affirmance.
The opinion undoubtedly paraphrased the counts of the information to a large extent. It should be remembered that "indecent and improper" liberties under the first offense of the statute
is not synonymous with "immodest, immoral and indecent" liberties under the second, third, and fourth offenses of the statute,
and a conviction upon taking "indecent and improper" liberties not
coupled with an assault is not proper.'-"
There were four cases decided which dealt primarily with
criminal evidence. The first of these, Bauman v. People,'9 was
reversed because prejudicial hearsay was admitted. A psychiatrist
gave evidence of the result of a staff meeting. This brought the
30
case squarely within the rule pronounced in Carter v. People.
Mr. Justice Holland filed a lengthy dissent which has already been
noted concerning the insanity procedures, and he also made comment in regard to prejudicial remarks made by the District Attorney as to punishment which the majority stated was corrected by
instruction. It is his view that such instructions are of doubtful
value in removing from the minds of the jury prejudicial remarks
of this type.
The case of Baney v. People 1 dealt with the res gestae rule.
The defendent was convicted of forcible rape, and the conviction
was reversed with order to discharge the defendant. Testimony
of what the complaining witness had related to law enforcement
officers some ten to fourteen hours following the alleged attack
was ruled hearsay and without the res gestae exception. After
citing Graves v. People,32 which quoted from Wharton as follows:
Res gestae are events speaking for themselves through the
instinctive words and acts of participants, not 33the words
and acts of participants when narrating events.
the Court determined that the testimony related only narrations
of fact, and was therefore hearsay.
The rule of circumstantial evidence was determinative of
Kidder v. People, 115 Colo. 72, 169 P. (2d) 181 (1946).
-Supra, note 7.
119 Colo. 342, 204 P. (2d) 147 (1949).
Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 3, pg. 84; 275 P. (2d) 195.
18 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 63 (1893).
Wharton, Crirn. Ev. sec. 262, 9th ed.
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the ruling ordering the defendant discharged. The facts and
circumstances "were not such as were incompatible with the innocence of the defendant and incapable of explanation upon any
'3
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt of defendant.
5
L. McRae v. People,3 presents perhaps what is new law. The
defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated robbery. It
was his contention in the Supreme Court that error was committed in the introduction of testimony of an admission against interest into evidence which related the fact that accused had informed the officers while under arrest that he had once been in
the penitentiary. The statement was made to the officers in explanation of his possession of a money order and currency.
The Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, held that if
any of the admission comes in that it comes in in toto. It was also
held that if it were admitted for purposes of attacking credibility,
it would have been error for the defendant had not taken the
witness stand.
However, the Court emphasized the voluntariness of the admission and stated the rule to be the same in written or oral confessions. Two eai.ly cases were cited by the Court in this regard
to support its conclusion.30 But if the Court has adopted the rule
must be voluntary, it has in
that both confessions and admissions
37
effect overruled Bruner v. People.
That opinion, which was by the same author, stated, "However,
if the statement is not a confession, the question as to its voluntarity is unimportant." It also quoted Abbot as follows:
A declaration made by one accused of a crime, denying any criminal act and explaining suspicious circumstances for his own advantage, is not a confession, and
that confessions must be
does not come within the rule
3
voluntary to be admissible.
Two decisions concerning the same defendant were handed
down as Miles v. People.39 The first allowed the record to be supplemented by the introduction of carbon copies of a confession
which had been lost, there appearing no reason to doubt the authenticity of the copies. The second case dealt with the law surrounding the confessions.
It was held that the proper procedure as outlined by Downey
v. People,40 was followed here. The trial court held a preliminary
hearing during which it concluded that the evidence was not suf"Beeler v. People, 58 Colo. 451, 146 Pac. 762 (1915).
I2Svpra, note 2.
124 Pac. 742 (1912); Rogers v. People,
6 Potyralski v. People, 53 Colo. 331,
76 Colo. 181, 230 Pac. 391 (1924).
113 Colo. 194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945).
"Abbot, Criminal Trial Brief, sec. 481.
3
'Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 5, pg. 163; 282 P. (2d) 1094. Vol. 7, C.B.A.
Ad. Sh. No. 10, pg. 318; 282 P. (2d) 1096.
,0Supra, note 25.
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ficient to exclude the confession, but that the weight to be given
thereto was for the jury. It was also held that under Schneider v.
People 41 it was proper to admit a joint confession which included
statements regarding similar offenses, as they were restricted by
instruction as evidence only of plan or design.
4 "
In the last case to be mentioned, M. McRae v. People, it
was held that where an irreconcilable conflict in the evidence was
presented it was the sole province of the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. This was a case of manslaughter while
driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol where the blood
alcohol analysis result was very high, and the only testimony as
to what the defendant had had to drink was "one and a half bottles
of 3.2 beer." The instructions as given by the trial court were
found to be without error and the conviction was affirmed with
one Judge dissenting.
In conclusion the writer would like to cite one more legislative
amendment, 40-14-2, '53 C.R.S. relating to obtaining goods under
false pretenses has been amended so that the dividing line between
4
a felony and misdemeanor is now $50.00 instead of $20.00. 3

TAXATION
By KEITH ANDERSON of the Dcnver Bar
DECISIONS

Only two cases dealing with this subject were before the Colorado Supreme Court during the past year. One has application
only to a special class of taxpayers, but the other is of interest to
all property owners.
In Cooper Motors, Inc. v. Board of Jackson County Commissioners, et al.,1 the plaintiff's attorneys asked the court to overrule
City and County of Denver v. Hover Motors, Inc.2 On an agreed
statement of facts, the trial court was presented with the issue
whether automobiles, upon which the specific ownership tax had
been paid, were subject to ad valorem taxes in those situations
where they form a part of a dealer's stock of merchandise. The
trial court, following the rule of law laid down in the Hover ca~e,
held that they were. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the lower court, overruling its holding in the Hover case. With
commendable frankness the court recognized its prior error in
construction of the applicable statute and constitutional provision.
The other case, Weidenhaft v. County Commissioners of El
Paso County, et al.,3 was an attack upon the validity of the statewide reappraisal program as applied to real property. The plain"118 Colo. 543, 199 P. (2d) 873 (1948).
'Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 13, pg. 460; 286 P. (2d) 618.
41S.B. 124, approved April 15, 1955.
'279 P. 2d 685, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
2 121 Colo. 439, 217 P. 2d 863.
3 283 P. 2d 164, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.No. 10.

